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Abstract—Along the time many Web Based Social Networks
(WBSNs) have appeared, but not all of them offer the same
services. Users may use multiple WBSNs to satisfy their
requirements. Besides, operations such as the creation of
accounts or the establishment of groups, are repeated in all
of them, being a tedious issue. To address this matter, this
paper proposes a protocol, based on the UMA core protocol
and the FOAF project, to attain interoperability and reusability
of resources, identity data and access control policies across
different WBSNs. Moreover, an evaluation and a security
analysis are presented.
KEYWORDS: INTEROPERABILITY, REUSABILITY, ACCESS
CONTROL, SOCIAL NETWORKS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web is full of Web Based Social Net-
works (WBSNs) but not all WBSNs offer the same services
and users have to decide which of them is more adequate
to satisfy their expectations. Besides, being user of several
WBSNs requires, for each of them, the creation of accounts,
the establishment of contact groups, the upload of resources
and the specifications of access control policies. Thus, the
problem emerges: is it possible to share resources with users
of different WBSNs without performing repeated opera-
tions? In other words, can interoperability and reusability
between different WBSNs be attainable?.
Along the time there have been multiple attempts to
provide some kind of interoperability between WBSNs,
analysed in Section II. Interoperability, given a definition
found in [1] and applying it to the social application context,
is the ability of WBSNs to work together within and across
any type of boundary in order to advance the effective
communication of all users. In the literature it is called the
Walled Garden Problem [2] and it can also be associated
with the access from different WBSNs to resources, identity
data and access control policies where resources correspond
to photos, videos and so on and identity data refers to profile
and contact relationship data. By contrast, reusability has not
been particularly studied in the WBSN context. Nonetheless,
reusability can be identified as a complementary feature to
interoperability because if a pair of elements are interopera-
ble between multiple WBSNs, it means that they can be anal-
ogously used and, thus, they can be reused. Moreover, none
development addresses either interoperability or reusability
regarding resources, identity data and access control policies.
Therefore, this paper proposes a solution subdividing the
problem as follows:
• Decentralization of access control policies.
• Decentralization of resource management procedures.
• Decentralization of identity data.
To reach a solution to all above mentioned problems a pro-
tocol called UMA+FOAF Social Network Protocol (U+F) is
developed. It bases on User-Managed Access (UMA) [3] to
addresses the first pair of problems and on the Friend-Of-A-
Friend (FOAF) project [4] to satisfy the last issue. On the
one hand, UMA is applied because it focuses on multiple
interoperable domains but there are not UMA prototypes
or works related to a concrete WBSN scenario. Moreover,
UMA identity management, though being in progress [5],
is not the main goal. On the other hand, as identified in
[6], FOAF seems a promising approach to specify users’
identity. Indeed, multiple current WBSNs, such as Facebook
or Youtube, and social applications, like Second Life, make
use of it.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
II contains related work. Section III specifies the purpose,
objectives and architecture of U+F. In Section IV the defini-
tion of identity data managed in U+F is presented. Section V
presents a description of U+F phases. Section VI describes
the evaluation. Finally, in Section VII conclusions and open
research issues are identified.
II. RELATED WORK
Interoperability and reusability have been addressed in
several proposals but none of them consider resources,
identity data and access control policies, Table 1.
In respect to resources interoperability and reusability
three proposals are noticed. Distributed Social Network
Protocol (DSNP) [7] bases on developing a distributed social
network in which users create their profiles, store them in
free chosen hosts and exchange resources with their contacts
through cryptographic mechanisms. From a distributed per-
spective, LotusNet [8] consists of a peer-to-peer system in
which peers store resources locally and rely on cryptography
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Table I: Related work description
Requirements
G. identity G. access G.
data control policies resources
Proposals
DSNP [7]
√
LotusNet [8]
√
OneSocialWeb [9]
√
UMA [3]
√ √
OpenID [10]
√
FOAF [4]
√
Microformats [12]
√
MyProfile [11]
√
to guarantee strong authentication. Other relevant proposal
is OneSocialWeb [9], it focuses on connecting of all WBSNs
analogously to emails are managed in different platforms.
On the other hand, some proposals address identity data
interoperability and reusability. Commonly, a service, re-
ferred as Identity Provider (IdP), is in charge of the storage
and the delivery of user identifications. A crucial example is
OpenID [10], a decentralized identification standard used to
identify users through URLs. Likewise, other contribution is
MyProfile [11], a single-sign-on procedure that authenticates
users by combining WebID and FOAF. Slightly different is
the Friend-Of-A-Friend (FOAF) project [4] which provides
a machine-readable ontology to describe people, things they
create and do and links between them. It combines the
use of the Resource Description Framework (RDF) and the
Web Ontology Language (OWL). Similarly, Microformats
[12] are used to describe people, companies, organizations
and places but it is not as easy and friendly as FOAF
and, by now, solutions are not specifically related to social
relationships.
Looking for resources and access control policies inter-
operability and reusability, User-Managed Access (UMA)
Working Group has developed an architecture and protocol
called UMA [3]. It puts the user in charge of assigning
access rights to resources.
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
U+F is a novel approach to achieve interoperability and
reusability between different WBSNs. Users control their
resources, identity data and access control policies without
requiring a specific WBSN to carry out these tasks. Re-
sources are stored in a particular number of hosts, identity
data is located in chosen IdPs and access control policies
are established in selected Authorization Managers.
As identified in Figure 1,supposing a user, User1, who
is a Facebook and a Badoo member, and other user, User2,
who is exclusively member of MySpace, they can interact
with each other because their identity data and resources
are accessed through WBSNs. Furthermore, as User1 has
multiple accounts, if desired, the same resources, access
control policies and identity data can be used.
A. Security goals
1) WBSNs have to access to the minimum data [13].
Once a WBSN accesses to data of a WBSN user,
the management has to be carried out using the least
possible data.
Figure 1: WBSNs - A single world
2) Requested data has to be only accessed by authorized
users.
3) User impersonation must be avoided. Requested data
has to be exclusively delivered from one WNSN to
another, being certain about the fact that the requested
WBSN does not impersonate the requesting user.
B. Architecture
U+F architecture consists of six entities, Figure 2:
User (U): a user has a pair of roles. Firstly, a user plays
the role of a UMA’s Requesting Party (RP) who is able to
access resources of his contacts through Social Networks.
Secondly, a user also plays the role of an Authorizing User
(AU) by performing three main operations, the placement of
resources in his Host together with later updates of them, the
deployment of his FOAF file in his IdP and the deployment
of policies in his Authorization Managers.
Identity provider (IdP): repository of FOAF files which
are placed by AUs, as well as, provider of claims. Moreover,
each IdP owns a certificate generated by an IdP Certification
Authority (IdP CA) to prove their validity and correctness in
respect to other IdPs and AMs. Besides, to verify requested
claims, per each user, IdPs store the list of IdP CAs that
each user considers reliable.
Host(H): repository of resources, analogous to a data base
service, in which the AU establishes resources.
Authorization Manager (AM): entity that evaluates poli-
cies previously established by an AU. However, to achieve
this purpose AM requests claims to perform policy valida-
tion and delivers tokens. Also, in order to verify claims, they
store, per each user, the identification of trusted IdP CAs.
Besides, it is possible the existence of multiple AMs,
Hosts and IdPs which depends on users’ choice but, for the
sake of simplicity, it is considered one Host and one IdP per
user, and one AM for each of these entities, Figures 1, 2.
Social Network (SN): WBSNs are referred as SNs. They
provide an interface to show resources and identity data
and facilitate the management of wall comments or other
services. It takes the role of a UMA requester, acts on behalf
of a RP and interacts with Hosts to reach protected resources.
Also, each time a user session starts, after performing the
user authentication regarding his Host and IdP, SNs interact
with the adequate IdP to get user personal data.
On the other hand, each SN owns a certificate generated
by a SN Certification Authority (SN CA) and stores, per
each user, the identification of the SN CAs that each user
considers reliable. Therefore, once a request is sent from a
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Figure 2: Architecture
SN to another, taking both the role of a requester, called
herein Fat Requester, certificates authenticate both SNs.
In the connection between SNs, given that it is not
specified in UMA, SSL is applied.
Certification authorities (CA): these entities are divided
in two groups. A first group provides certificates to trusted
IdPs (IdP CAs) and another group to trusted SNs (SN CAs).
Certificates delivery is performed regarding specific criterion
and rules whose specification is an open research issue.
The existence of groups of CAs instead of a single
entity is due to the huge quantity of WBSN users and the
complexity of its management. Likewise, also looking for
the simplification of certificates management, there are CAs
to independently certify IdPs and SNs.
Notice that trust relationships between IdPs, Host and
AMs are established through the storage of above mentioned
identification lists of IdP CAs and SN CAs.
IV. PERSONAL FILE
Identity data refers to profile and contact relationship data
which are structured in a FOAF file specially developed
for U+F. In the FOAF project specification [14] a great
set of available attributes are defined. However, some other
attributes have been created in this work. Regarding profile
data, it is developed the attribute ”WBSNs” which refers
to the name of WBSNs, separated by a space, that the
contact is registered in. Moreover, profile data consists of,
at least,the user name and the user email address which,
for security reasons, is stored after having applied a hash
function to it. On the other hand, in respect to relationship
data, the following attributes per relationship have been
developed: ”creation date”, that refers to the date when the
relationship was established; ”trust”, that corresponds to a
numeric relationship trust level (1-the least; 10-the most
trusted); ”duration”, which corresponds to the relationship
validity period; and ”WBSNs” analogous to the one afore-
mentioned. Moreover, in respect to relationships, they are
unidirectional and supposing that a user, called Bob, has a
work relationship with a user called Alice, his FOAF file
includes Alice’s relationship but not necessarily in the other
way round.
Nonetheless, in U+F reduced FOAF files are also used. In
general, they correspond to a FOAF file without relationship
information and with attributes regarding access control
policies.
V. U+F PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
A. Initialization
The initialization, subdivided in three steps, focuses on
preparing entities with all required information.
1) Registration of entities: It involves the registration
of a Host at an AM and the registration of an IdP at an
AM, which can be the same AM or a different one. These
registrations are equivalent to the introduction of a Host to
an AM described in UMA [15]. A user, in the role of an
AU, introduces the Host or the IdP in the chosen AM to
make available later validation of tokens.
To conclude, registration finishes when the user specifies
in his AMs and IdPs the list of trusted IdP CAs.
2) Registration of resources and identity data: This phase
focuses on registering new resources and the appropriate
FOAF file in the selected Host and IdP. Specifically, the
registration of resources and identity data is equivalent to
UMA [15]. Once again each user takes the role of an AU.
3) Specification of main information in WBSNs: In each
WBSN, once a user logins for the first time, he specifies the
IdP in which his FOAF file is stored and the Host which
stores his resources. Besides, to achieve interaction between
WBSNs, each user specifies the list of SN CAs in which
each of them trusts.
B. User logins in a WBSN
Each time a user logins in a WBSN, taking the role of
a RP, his profile and contacts are directly presented and his
resources remain accessible. To acquire these data, the user
is authenticated against his IdP and Host by the SN and,
then, each SN, in the role of a requester and on behalf of the
user, contacts to the user’s IdP and Host to get his FOAF file
and resources respectively. The step of accessing a protected
resource of UMA protocol [15] is executed twice, one to get
the FOAF file and another to acquire resources.
The process requires the acquisition of claims and the nec-
essary mutual authentication between the RP and his Host
and IdP to later delegate access to SNs, being these issues
not detailed in UMA. Authentication can be carried out ap-
plying multiple mechanisms and protocols. Using symmetric
cryptography, some mechanisms in respect to the Challenge-
Response protocol are a feasible choice. By contrast, though
increasing complexity, public key cryptography is another
alternative, for example the mechanism proposed by [16].
However, avoiding impersonations requires authenticate the
user in the WBSN log in and out. Furthermore, also trying
to prevent this issue, all performed signatures include a
time stamp. Thus, users in access control policies specify
an accepted time stamp threshold. Also, note that time is
obtained by a trusted site like NIST Internet Time Service.
In relation to claims, AM IdP requests claims to provide
the appropriate token regarding the requested FOAF file and
they correspond to a proof of the identity of the owner of the
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requested file, the RP. On the other hand, AM Host requests
claims to provide a token to access requested resources and
they also correspond to a proof to identify the RP. In order
to acquire claims, the SN in which the RP delegates requests
the accreditation of the RP to the IdP. Then, the IdP creates
a signed structure, including a reduced FOAF file with the
name and email of the user, which corresponds to claims.
Finally, when AMs receive claims, they verify signatures,
making use of the list of IdP CAs specified by the user, and
validate access control policies to later deliver tokens. Once
claims and tokens are obtained, they are stored in the SN
for the whole session of the user. Then, if needed, they are
delivered without having to be requested again. Nonetheless,
the erasure of tokens and claims when a user logs out is
recommendable to prevent unnoticed impersonations.
According to Figure 3, the technical specification of the
most relevant message, being equivalent the FOAF file and
resource acquisition, is the following:
6) User1 accreditation: the IdP sends a signed reduced
FOAF file which includes the name and email of the
RP and a time stamp. For example, it is supposed that
a user, Bob, logins in a SN.
<rdf:RDF> ... <foaf:Person rdf:nodeID=”RequesterBob”> <foaf:name>Bob Smith Brown
</foaf:name> <foaf:mbox sha1sum>8567c8b121ffcd99604a40jhf5 52a2d884c234b3
</foaf:mbox sha1sum> </foaf:Person> </rdf:RDF> + timeStamp + Signature of IdP Bob
C. User accesses to a contact’s data
Once a user is within a WBSN in multiple circumstances
desires to access to data of his contacts. However, if contacts
are enrolled in different WBSNs, interactions between these
applications are indispensable. First of all, given a user of
SN1, User1, who wants to access to resources of one of his
contacts, User2, all WBSNs in which User2 is registered in
have to be identified. Indeed, this information is available
in the FOAF file of User1, as described in Section IV.
Then, User1 chooses one WBSN, for example SN2, and
the procedure described in this Section is performed.
When User1 desires to visualize the profile and resources
of User2, he clicks on User2 relationship, and if this user
also has a relationship with User1, the profile and resources
are delivered according to User2’s access control policies.
This process is composed of a pair of UMA protocol
executions in respect to the step of accessing a protected
resource. One execution is carried out to acquire the re-
duced FOAF file of User2. The second UMA execution
corresponds to the acquisition of resources of User2 and
it can be performed repetitively.
For the sake of simplicity and due to the analogy between
acquiring the profile and resource of User2, which only
differs on requesting data to an IdP or to a Host, in
the following Section, the acquisition of the FOAF file is
described and it is depicted in Figure 4.
1) FOAF file acquisition: The procedure differs from
UMA in a couple of points. On the one hand, SN1 and SN2
play the role of a Fat Requester (pointed out in Section 2).
On the other hand, claims are clearly detailed. In par-
ticular, to obtain the token that grants access to requested
identity data, the AM IdP User2 requests claims to User1
that consist of three elements. The first element corresponds
to a proof of his relationship with User2. Considering
that relationships are unidirectional, this proof refers to
a relationship structure regarding the existence of User1
relationship in the FOAF file of User2. The second element
corresponds to a proof of possessing some attributes. This
proof is a structure that depends on access control policies,
thereby attributes can be requested or not and they can differ
from one request to another. The last proof corresponds to
the identification of the RP, User1.
More specifically, in order to get claims, User1 can
provide them or delegate in SN1. Supposing that User1
delegates in SN1, this SN acquires, through IdP User1, a
signed structure in relation to requested attributes, a signed
structure to certify User1’s identity and a signed relationship
structure which identifies the relationship between both
users. After obtaining the last pair of structures, they are sent
to SN2 and redirected to IdP User2. Then, when IdP User2
verifies the received signed structures and if the requested
relationship exists, it signs the received relationship structure
and sends it back to SN1. Lastly, SN1 sends claims to
AM IdP User2.
The technical specification of relevant messages regarding
this procedure is described above. All presented messages
correspond to an example in which a User1, called Bob,
wishes to access the profile data of a User2, called Alice.
Moreover, to access to Alice’s data, Bob has to be student
of Carlos III University and older than 20.
8) User1/SN1 claims request(User1-User2 relationship
authentication+User1 needed data): AM Host User2
requires as claims a relationship structure to verify
the relationship between the RP and the owner of the
data, and an attribute structure to verify access control
policies, being both of them composed of two parts.
The relationship structure consists of a pair of tags. On
the one hand, between the tags <first> and </first>,
it is included a reduced FOAF file with the name and
email of User1. On the other hand, between the tags
<end> and </end>, it is included a reduced FOAF file
with the name and email of the user whose resources
want to be accessed, User2.
The attribute structure consists of a couple of tags.
On the one hand, between tags <attributes> and
</attributes> attributes to perform policy validation
are included. On the other hand, between tags
<attributesData> and </attributesData> a reduced FOAF
file with the name, email and requested attributes of
the RP is included.
In the example, chief issues to determine are the
verification of the relationship between Alice and Bob
and Bob’s possession of requested attributes.
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<first> </first> <end> </end> + <attributes>schoolhomepage age</attributes>
<attributesData></attributesData>
11) Signed(User1 accreditation)+Signed(User1-User2 re-
lationship)+Signed(User1 needed data): IdP User1
sends a signed reduced FOAF file which includes the
name and email of the User1, a signed relationship
structure identifying the relationship that has to be
certified and a signed attribute structure which in-
cludes a reduced FOAF file with attributes requested,
all of them associated with a time stamp. In the
example Bob receives an accreditation of his identity,
the relationship structure specifying that he wants to
access to Alice data and an attribute structure which
certifies the possession of requested attributes.
<rdf:RDF> ... <foaf:Person rdf:nodeID=”RequesterBob”> <foaf:name>Bob Smith
Brown</foaf:name> <foaf:mbox sha1sum>8567c8b121ffcd99604a40jhf5 52a2d884c234b3
</foaf:mbox sha1sum> </foaf:Person> </rdf:RDF> + timeStamp + Signature of IdP Bob
<first> <rdf:RDF> ... <foaf:Person rdf:nodeID=”RequesterBob”> <foaf:name>Bob Smith Brown
</foaf:name> <foaf:mbox sha1sum>8567c8b121ffcd99604a40jhf5 52a2d884c234b3
</foaf:mbox sha1sum> </foaf:Person> </rdf:RDF> </first> <end>
<rdf:RDF> ... <foaf:Person rdf:nodeID=RequesterAlice> <foaf:name>Alice Cook Adams
</foaf:name> <foaf:mbox sha1sum>8567c8b121ffcd99604a40jhf552 a2d884c234b3
</foaf:mbox sha1sum> </foaf:Person> </rdf:RDF> </end>+ timeStamp + Signature of
IdP Alice+ <attributes>schoolhomepage age</attributes> <attributesData> <rdf:RDF> ...
<foaf:Person rdf:nodeID=”RequesterBob”> <foaf:name>Bob Smith Brown</foaf:name>
<foaf:mbox sha1sum>8567c8b121ffcd99604a40jhf5 52a2d884c234b3</foaf:mbox sha1sum>
<foaf:schoolhomepage> www.uc3m.es</foaf:schoolhomepage> <foaf:age>26</foaf:age>
</foaf:Person> </rdf:RDF> </attributesData>+ timeStamp + Signature of IdP Bob
15) Signed(User1-User2 relationship): IdP User2 signs
the relationship structure received (removing the pre-
vious signature) if User1 is in the FOAF file of User2,
thereby guaranteeing a relationship between them.
In conclusion, there are some points to highlight. Firstly,
in case multiple data are joined under the same policy, the
token obtained provides access to all of them. Secondly, as
pointed out in Section V-B, claims are stored in the SN that
initially sends the request to, if required, be later delivered
without being requested again. Similarly, tokens achieved are
stored and reused if their expiration time does not exceed.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Interoperability and reusability
Data used in U+F is decentralized, resources are stored
in Hosts, identity data in IdPs and access control policies
in AMs. Then, data can be replaced, moved or updated
without affecting any service of WBSNs. Also, given the
decentralization, different WBSNs can make use of the same
resources, identity data and access control policies when the
same IdPs and Host are linked to them.
Regarding interoperability, as described along the whole
paper, the use of the same identity data specification, FOAF
files in this case, and the use of a concrete application
of UMA, including the specification of claims and the Fat
Requester, address this issue.
B. Performance
Trying to attain more specific results, Table 2 presents per
each protocol phase and according to Figure 3 and Figure 4
(considering contact resource acquisition too), the number
of messages exchanged, the number of entities involved,
the computational cost in relation to performed operations
Table II: U+F evaluation
U+F No. No. Computational UMA
phases Messages Entities Cost Executions
Registration of entities 10N+10M N+M+1 O(1) N
Registration of resources and identity data 3(PX+IX ) N+M+T+1 O(1) PX
Worst case
User logins in a SN 11+11RX 5 O(ZX )+O(PX ) 1+RX
User accesses to contact data 23+23R2 7 O(Z2)+O(Z1)+O(P2) 1+RX
Best case
User logins in a SN 11+5RX 3 O(ZX )+O(PX ) 1+1
User accesses to contact data 23+9R2 4 O(Z2)+O(Z1)+O(P2) 1+1
N = No. registered Hosts by a user ZX = No. FOAF files stored in the IdP of UserX
M = No. registered IdPs by a user PX = No. Resources stored in the Host of UserX
T = No. registered AMs by a user IX = No. Identity data stored in the IdP of UserX
RX = No. Resources accessed in the Host of UserX
over data stored in IdPs and Hosts and the total complete
executions of phases of UMA protocol. Nonetheless, in order
to have a general perception of U+F executions, phases User
logins in a SN and User accesses to a contact’s data are
studied regarding the worst and best case. In relation to the
worst case, it is assumed that all messages of the protocol
are carried out because no information is stored and reused.
On the contrary, according to the best case, it is assumed
that claims and tokens are stored and reused.
From Table 2 some relevant features can be inferred.
Regarding the number of messages exchanged, it is signifi-
cant the quantity of them required in the registration phase,
which increases in respect to the number of entities involved.
Similarly, though equivalent to current WBSNs, the number
of messages in the registration of resources increases in
relation to the number of registered resources. However, the
most significant exchange of messages corresponds to User
logins in a SN and User accesses to a contact’s data. Both
phases involve a great quantity of messages but claims and
tokens are usually reused and, as shown in the best case, the
number of messages can be significantly lower.
In respect to entities, the use of multiple AMs, Hosts
and IdPs is specially significant in registration processes.
Nonetheless, it is not expected the used of a huge quantity
of these entities. For example, one IdP per user is expected.
On the other hand, according to computational cost, it is
remarkable the complexity of User accesses to a contact’s
data which, despite being linear, is the highest one and
depends on multiple variables.
Lastly, in respect to UMA executions, the difference
between the worst and best case is extremely noticeable and
understandable. If tokens expiration time exceeds, they are
reused and complete executions of UMA are avoided.
C. Security analysis
This Section analyses the satisfaction of the security goals
highlighted in Section III.
The acquisition of claims can be carried out in multiple
ways. For example, exchanging complete FOAF files be-
tween WBSNs. Nevertheless, to satisfy the first of security
goals, which refers to the fact that WBSNs access to the
minimum data of other WBSNs contacts, data exchanged
is limited to name, email and WBSNs in which each user
is enrolled in. In the worst case if users establish ”public”
access control policies, WBSNs get access to all users
data. By contrast, in a better case, if users restrict access
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Figure 3: User logins in a SN
Figure 4: User accesses a to contact FOAF file
to personal attributes such as their hobbies, the procedure
developed prevents WBSNs from knowing them.
On the other hand, data confidentiality is achieved by the
establishment of access control policies attached to data.
Finally, user impersonation is mainly avoided due to
the mutual authentication between each user and his IdP
and Host, in the log in and out in a WBSN. Then, the
user’s IdP and Host are informed about his presence in the
application. Moreover, signatures that include a time stamp
and the consideration of trusted relationships between IdPs,
Hosts and AMs through the storage of identification lists
of IdP CAs and SN CAs are also essential to address this
issue.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
Many WBSNs are currently in use and given their lack of
interoperability and reusability, this work proposes a solution
called U+F Social Network Protocol that bases on the UMA
protocol and the FOAF project.
This proposal can be extended in several ways. First,
users are not completely in control of their data and once
presented to WBSNs, these applications can take over them.
A possible solution focuses on the use of cryptography.
Second, the inclusion of complex access control policies
regarding multiple jumps is an open research issue. Third,
other open issue refers to the inclusion of OpenID in U+F,
simplifying the management of users identification. Finally,
highlighted in Section III-B, constraints and rules to specify
the validity of trusted IdPs and AMs have to be detailed.
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